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FOREWORD
On July 16, 2008 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice launched
the Civil Response Corps (CRC) which would function much like
our military reserve. It would ease the burden on the Armed
Forces by allowing the hiring of civilians with critical skills to
serve on missions abroad when America needs them. The CRC
is a product of the efforts of State Department’s Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The core mission of S/
CRS is to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government
civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations,
and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from
conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward
peace, good governance, and a market economy.
This Letort Paper examines the current Building Partner
Capacity and Stability Operations capabilities and capacities
within the Army and how they relate and complement the efforts
of the CRC. Does the U.S. Army or the Department of Defense
have the proper force structure and minimal capability to fight
and win through all phases of conflict? This paper provides a
framework for identifying proponency, institutionalizing lessons
learned, and providing a military, police, and governance structure
as a tool for global engagement. This new structural paradigm
complements S/CRS’s efforts to provide the United States with
the ability to access, influence, and build capacity throughout this
new world order.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this
analysis as a contribution to the debate on how the Department
of Defense will provide structure for both Building Partnership
capacity as well as Stability Operations. We provide glossary to
assist the reader.

		
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
This paper examines the current Building Partner
Capacity and Security Force Assistance capabilities
and capacities within the U.S. Army as well as the
Department of Defense. The current operational
environment calls for us to look at history, policy,
doctrine, and other academic proposals to identify
capability and capacity gaps. As the General Purpose
Force looks forward to expanding roles in Irregular
Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense, and Security
Assistance, does the U.S. Army have the proper force
structure and minimal capability to fight and win the
counterinsurgency of the future? This paper analyzes
this construct and provides a framework for identifying
proponency, institutionalizing lessons learned from
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, as well as providing military,
police and governance structure as a tool for global
engagement. This new structural paradigm will help
the United States gain access, influence, and build
capacity throughout this new world order.

BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY/
SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE:
A NEW STRUCTURAL PARADIGM
Until our government decides to plus up our civilian
agencies like the Agency for International Development,
Army Soldiers can expect to be tasked with . . . standing
up and mentoring indigenous forces . . . reviving public
services, rebuilding infrastructure, and promoting
good governance. All these so-called “nontraditional
capabilities” have moved into the mainstream of
military thinking, planning and strategy—where they
must stay.1

The U.S. Army is at a significant crossroads as it
defines its roles, missions, and force structure for
future operations. The Army began reorganizing in
2003 to a brigade-based full-spectrum force called
the Modular Brigade Combat Team (BCT). This
reorganization stemmed from a requirement to
become more flexible and adaptive, and to provide
a larger pool of forces available for conflicts in both
Iraq and Afghanistan. In response, “the Department
of Defense (DOD) and the Army initiated significant
changes in doctrine, education, and training, focusing
on counterinsurgency, stabilization, and training/
advising foreign militaries.”2 Secretary Robert M. Gates
has challenged the Army to prepare for asymmetric
warfare, partner capacity building, and Stability,
Security, Transition, and Reconstruction3 (SSTR)
operations. What has lagged behind these initiatives
is a commensurate degree of force structure change to
meet our future requirements.
According to the Army’s 2006 Posture Statement,
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the Army is required to be able to conduct joint,
multinational operations anywhere across the spectrum
of operations. This spectrum ranges from the low end—
emphasizing stability and civil support operations—to
high end—emphasizing major combat operations.4

The impetus to accomplish these missions is the new
BCT. The configuration will be “more flexible to deal
with irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges
as well as traditional warfare.”5
The question then remains: Can the Army, as a fullspectrum, rotational, and expeditionary force, meet its
Partner Capacity Building (PCB) mission from Phase
0 (Shaping Operations) through Phase 4 (Stability
Operations) without additional force structure? The
Army faces a gap in its ability to meet the Combatant
Commanders’ daily operational requirements regarding Theater Security Cooperation (TSC), military
engagement, and PCB. This gap is widening as the
Army believes it is in a period of “persistent conflict.”
However, others believe that even without the current
Global War on Terror (GWOT), the Army must shift
from its paradigm (full-spectrum capable) and create
organizations that can meet both Shaping Operations
and Stability Operations.6 This paper examines the
changes to our current operational environment
to include our long history in U.S. Security Force
Assistance (SFA), the current requirements for PCB
and its relationship with SSTR and other proposals, the
doctrinal construct for PCB and the current capability
gaps. This paper also addresses other options for the
creation of specialized units such as Theater Military
Advisory and Assistance Groups (TMAAGs) as
well as National and Theater Reconstruction Teams
(NRTs-TRTs). The development and incorporation of
these new units will enable the Army to meet its full2

spectrum requirements creating new tools that can
enhance our TSC-PCB strategies as well as stabilization
and advisory missions.
CHANGES TO THE ENVIRONMENT
Since the end of the bipolar confrontation with the
Soviet Union, the United States has faced a varied and
unstable world. The emergence of nonstate actors in
failed nations or ungoverned spaces has increased
the risk from transnational terrorists seeking to harm
the United States. These terrorists seek to operate
asymmetrically, using tools of insurgency and irregular
warfare to avoid U.S. conventional strength:
This type of warfare has been historically disadvantageous to the U.S.; it is expensive, protracted, creates
persistent casualties, and provides the terrorist a
strategic psychological advantage against an impatient
U.S. general population.7

Additionally, this asymmetric threat has challenged
our soldiers to execute many additional and varied
tasks. Soldiers are required to become:
nation builders as well as warriors, they must be prepared
to help reestablish institutions and local security forces
and assist in rebuilding infrastructure and basic services.
. . . performing these tasks involves extensive coordination and cooperation.8

HISTORICAL U.S. SECURITY FORCE
ASSISTANCE
This is not the first time in our nation’s history
that we have been called to perform these tasks, as
showin in Figure 1. The U.S. Army has been involved
with nation-building, advising, or training indigenous
3

forces for most of its history. Most of these tasks were
associated with counterinsurgency operations. During
the Philippine War in 1899, the U.S. Army was heavily
involved with training and advising the Philippine
Scouts to combat an insurgency. The United States
executed President William McKinley’s “Benevolent
Assimilation” policy, founded on protecting the
populace while executing civil projects. The policy
focused on infrastructure improvements as well as
establishing police, schools, and local governance. The
Army was trained and ready to execute this mission
as it drew from experiences in the Civil and Indian
Wars. Additionally, the combination of regular and
volunteer forces provided the Army the appropriate
skill sets to accomplish the benevolence policy as well
as pacification requirements.9

Figure 1. Historical U.S. Security Force Assistance.10
During World War II, the U.S. Army conducted
large scale training and advisory missions with the
Chinese and French North African forces. After the
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landings in North Africa, some 500 U.S. Army advisors
retrained over 260,000 French troops in eight divisions
for combat in Italy and France. By late 1944, 4,800
dedicated U.S. Army advisors were with 30 divisions
of the Nationalist Chinese forces. General Albert C.
Wedemeyer believed that retaining these advisors
after 1945 could have saved China.11
After World War II, U.S. Army advisors served
around the world, most significantly in Greece, Turkey,
Korea, and South Vietnam as part of Military Advisory
Groups (MAGs). With less than 300 advisors by 1953,
KMAG in Korea successfully reorganized the Republic
of Korea Army of over 20 divisions into an effective
combat force.12
Unfortunately, in Vietnam, the Army ignored
the insights from its past. Initial attempts to change
counterinsurgency tactics and procedures failed due
to a “very strong organizational culture predisposed
to a conventional attrition-based doctrine.”13 Roger
Hilsman, an aide and advisor to President John F.
Kennedy and whose views on counterinsurgency were
formed as a member of Merrill’s Marauders in World
War II, gave a speech on August 10, 1961. He decried
that “traditionalists believe that well-trained regulars
can do anything . . . for effective counterinsurgency
operations we need radical changes in organization,
combat doctrine, and equipment.”14 Fortunately,
changes were made.
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) developed
a program called the Civilian Irregular Defense Group
(CIDG) which focused on pacification and oil spot
security, especially in the Darlac Province.15 They were
successful until the CIDG transferred to the Military
Assistance Command—Vietnam (MACV) in 1963 due
to a report that the Special Forces Advisors were being
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used improperly.16 Their focus changed from population
security and pacification to offensive operations with
the Army of Vietnam. Unfortunately, this tactic did
not work and in 1966 prompted Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara to state that military solutions alone
would not win the war. Despite great debate, little
effort was given to political military efforts to defeat the
insurgency. Robert Komer commented that there was
no organization within the U.S. Government trained
and equipped to perform this political and economic
mission. “It’s the great difficulty of getting things done
by the bureaucracy, especially when you’re confronted
with an exceedingly atypical situation which requires
exceedingly atypical responses.”17
Komer was instrumental in helping to create the Civil
Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
organization called CORDS. “CORDS were a dramatic
change from business as usual, incorporating personnel
from the CIA, USIA [U.S. Information Agency], USAID
[U.S. Agency for International Development], the State
Department, and military services.”18 He knew that
military support was key to the CORDS success, and
they directed “unified civil-military advisory teams in
all 250 districts and 44 provinces.”19 By the time troops
were pulled out, the CORDS program helped pacify
most of the hamlets in South Vietnam. In the end, the
MACV employed over 14,000 U.S. Army field advisors
at its peak in 1970, including 1,800 Special Forces (SOF)
advisors.20
After Vietnam, this advisory role and the broader
mission of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) belonged
almost exclusively to SOF. Modest operations were
successfully conducted in Central and South America
(especially in El Salvador), and more recently in the
Balkans and Philippines. Since September 11, 2001
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(9/11), the requirement to conduct large military
advisory missions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere
as part of the GWOT has expanded beyond the capacity
of SOF alone.
Unfortunately, organizations such as CORDS were
disbanded, and other U.S. agencies reduced as part of
peace dividends. Today, USAID consists of just 1,000
Foreign Service Officers (FSOs), 1,000-plus government
service employees, and about 6,000 service contract
and foreign nationals.21 The Department of State (DoS)
is also at an all-time low, with just over 6,000 FSOs as
well, while the requirements of Iraq and Afghanistan
virtually mirror those of Vietnam. As Colonel H. R.
McMaster notes:
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon reveal the need for
balanced joint capabilities and additional capacity in
other agencies to assist in post conflict stability and
counterinsurgency operations. At the operational level,
forces must be capable of conducting counterinsurgency,
stability or state-building operations.22

CURRENT REQUIREMENTS FOR STABILITY
OPERATIONS
Despite the ad-hoc nature of these historic endeavors, U.S. Army advisors succeeded in providing
an integrated program of pacification, civic action, and
economic development through each of these conflicts.
Despite that record, the military continues to ignore the
lessons of the past. The Army has created ad-hoc war
time SSTR capabilities with no real joint or interagency
backbone or lasting capability. These efforts have
focused solely on post-conflict operations with no
thought of expanding tools of preemption. Currently,
no one agency executes operational control of U.S. soft
7

and hard power Stability Operations capabilities. The
U.S. ability to project civilian instruments of national
power such as diplomacy, foreign assistance, economic
reconstruction and development, as well as rule of law,
is underfunded and underdeveloped. As Secretary
Gates pointed out, “I remain concerned that we have
yet to create any permanent capability or institution to
rapidly create and deploy these kinds of skills in the
future. We need to develop a permanent sizeable cadre
of immediately deployable experts with disparate
skills.”23
Secretary Gates emphasizes the way to institutionalize these capabilities is probably not to recreate or repopulate institutions such as the U.S. Army
Intelligence Agency (USAIA) or USAID, or to develop
elements in the Departments of Agriculture, Treasury,
Commerce, or Justice that would be deployable
overseas; rather “new institutions are needed for the
21st century, new organizations with a 21st century
mind-set.”24
Figure 2 lays out the national security requirements for Stability Operations. National Security
Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD 44), Management
of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and
Stabilization, states: “The U.S. will work to anticipate
state failure, avoid it wherever possible, and respond
quickly and effectively when necessary and appropriate
to promote peace, security, development, democratic
processes, market economies and the rule of law.”25
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Figure 2. National Security References for Stability
Operations.26
In response, with the publication of DODD 3000.05,
Military Support for SSTR Operations, DoD announced
Stability Operations would become a core U.S.
military mission. Additionally, the 2006 Quadrennial
Defense Review articulated the concept of Stability
Operations and Partner Capacity Building—which
includes enhancing TSC activities—as an important
element for future national security. Specifically PCB
is to enhance the capabilities of, and cooperation with,
our international partners. Another internal objective
is to improve interagency planning and operational
procedures.
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In response to NSPD 44, the Secretary of State is
required to:
Coordinate and lead integrated United States
Government efforts, involving all U.S. Agencies with
relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct
stabilization and reconstruction activities. The Secretary
of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary
of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or
ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of
conflict.27

Through NSPD 44, the Civilian Stabilization
Initiative, a modern-day version of the CORDS was
born. Through this initiative, the State Department
created the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization (S/CRS) with a mission to build a U.S.
Government Civilian Response Capability to support
Stabilization and Reconstruction (R&S) operations.
The S/CRS developed the following core issues
with reconstruction and stabilization and focused on
finding a solution to each unique set of problems:28
• Lack of common planning approach, assessment tools and reliable measures of progress;
• No unified operating system to ensure command
and control;
• Limited civilian capacity to manage and implement R&S response;
• Gap in specialized training and preparation
for civilians deploying quickly to conflict and
unstable environments;
• No common repository for capturing and
applying lessons learned and best practices;
• Critical shortage of rapid, flexible funding for
non-humanitarian activities—constrains effective allocation and management of R&S resources; slows rate of U.S. civilian deployments.
10

In response, the S/CRS created three organizations.29
The nucleus of the new organization is the Active
Response Corps (ARC) which includes 250 active
responders from State, USAID, Justice, Commerce,
Agriculture, Health and Human Services, Department
of Homeland Security, and Treasury. The U.S.
Government staff is trained and ready to deploy
within 72 hours of an announcement of an U.S. military
operation. The team will assess the situation, design a
response, and begin R&S implementation. They team
also has the capability to deploy up to 1 year.
The second group is roughly a 2,000-strong
Standby Response Corps (SRC) pulled from the same
demographics as the ARC. The SRC would train
for 2 to 3 weeks a year and is the second element to
deploy. It deploys within 45 to 60 days up to 180 days
a rotation.
The third element is the Civilian Reserve Corps
(CRC) consisting of 2,000 experts drawn from jobs
outside the federal government. The CRC would
become U.S. Government employees when mobilized
and are fully trained and deployable in 30-60 days for
up to 1 year. They will provide sector-specific civilian
response expertise and maintain a 4-year service
obligation. This is the type of organization Secretary
Gates has advocated. The 2009 budget is seeking
$249 million for the program, but as Gates points
out “arguing for more funds for another agency is
considered blasphemy.”30
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ARMY FORCE REQUIREMENTS FOR STABILITY
OPERATIONS
Now that the S/CRS has an organizational construct
for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations, what
has the Army done to train, man, and equip General
Purpose Forces (GPF) to conduct Stability Operations
as well as TSC tasks? To date, the Army has developed
temporary ad-hoc Transition Teams (TT) and Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Additionally, the Army
added permanent force structure for Human Terrain
Teams (HTT)31 as well as Red Teams.32 There has
also been a shift in Cold War structure to form more
modular contemporary capabilities such as adding
military intelligence (MI), military police (MP), and
Engineer companies. However, these “new” units
are not specifically designed for counterinsurgency,
stabilization, training, and advisory missions, but
instead are full-spectrum capable units.33 These
initiatives, combined with the increase of over 1,300
Civil Affairs (CA) personnel in the Army, will form
the same capabilities as those found in CORDS.34
What is misleading is that approximately 400 of
these CA personnel are active duty and only support
special operations. None of these personnel belong to
permanent organizations with specified missions and
tasks. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC) has also responded to the requirements
for increased foreign language knowledge as well as
cultural understanding. TRADOC has developed “the
TRADOC Cultural Center (TCC), expanded the Defense
Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC)
operations, and has developed the University of
Foreign Military and Cultural Studies (UFMCS).”35 All
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are important first steps, but how do we operationalize
language and cultural understanding and make it an
enduring capability?
Secretary Gates again argues “the most important
military component in the War on Terror is not the
fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable
and empower our partners to defend and govern
their own countries.” 36 This statement identifies the
central theme of this paper. Unfortunately, neither
our historical experiences nor national directives have
focused the Army to organize to meet these current
and enduring challenges. Army and Marine Corps
Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM) 3-24 and the
Draft FM 3-07 (Stability Operations) fail to discuss the
requirements for specialized and dedicated stability or
support units. Instead, the doctrine recommends that
units task organize forces to meet individual mission
requirements. Task organization occurs all the time
within the Army and the Joint Force. However, these
forces are not ad-hoc organizations. They are units with
Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) designed
to accomplish specific missions. Yet, the Army does not
possess even the minimum number of experts required
to accomplish stabilization or advisory missions.
To further amplify the shortfalls, the Irregular
Warfare Joint Operating Concept (IWJOC) calls on the
GPF to do more. The relationship between Irregular
Warfare (IW), SSTR, and Major Combat Operations
(MCO) is complex at best and requires multiple
capabilities as shown in Figure 3. Specific GPF
requirements for IW include three key tasks:37
1. Build surrogate and partner nation security force
capacity on a global scale.
2. Provide interim military government or perform
civil administration functions.
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3. Expand the role of the U.S. Military Group
(MILGRP) to support IW.

Figure 3. JOC Relationships.38
In spite of these growing specialized requirements,
the Army has argued against “specialized forces”
to conduct Stability Operations. In accordance with
the Army Position Paper: Force Structure for Stability
Operations, “operational experience supports the
Army’s view that a combined-arms modular force,
fully trained to conduct full-spectrum operations, is
more effective in the current environment and more
flexible to meet the range of joint force requirements
under realistic, fiscal and end-strength restrictions.”39
The Army conducted modeling over a 7-year
period that compared two different force structure
configurations to attempt to validate its position. One
was a BCT-based modular force, and the second was a
force that contained a mix of approximately 60 percent
SO specialized forces and 40 percent BCT modular
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forces. “The pure BCT modular structure was capable of
executing 93 percent of its total mission load (including
SO) and 100 percent of its Major Combat Operations
(MCO) requirement. The BCT/specialized mix was
capable of executing 68 percent of its total mission
load (including SO) and only 20 percent of its MCO
requirement.”40 Critics argue this mix is unrealistic
and that the all or nothing approach is fundamentally
flawed.
OTHER PROPOSALS FOR SPECIALIZED UNITS
Historically, Special Forces were the only units to
provide regionally–oriented soldiers with language
skills capable of executing Foreign Internal Defense
(FID), host nation Internal Defense and Development
(IDAD) programs, and training of indigenous forces.41
That paradigm has shifted. Currently, Army and
Marine SOF units seek only to train other foreign SF
units, leaving the GPF to execute basic and advanced
individual skills.42 Additionally, there have been
proposals to create specialized units to deal exclusively
with stabilization, security, and reconstruction
operations as well as peacekeeping and enforcement
operations.
Stabilization Units.
In May 2005, the House Armed Services Committee
(HASC) requested that the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) publish a study on how to increase the
Army’s ability to conduct stability type missions and
decrease the reliance on the Reserve Component. One
of the options was to establish R&S Divisions.
CBO’s option was to eliminate one heavy and
one light division from the current force structure,
15

each with three Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and
supporting units. These resources would then create
five R&S divisions—four in the active component and
one in the reserves. Each R&S division would include
MPs, engineers, medical, CA, and psychological
operations units, as well as a Stryker BCT.43 These
designs, according to the CBO, “could save $18 billion
in operational and support costs through 2022, and 1
billion annually thereafter.”44 The Army counters this
position by arguing it would reduce the Army’s ability
to fight and win our nation’s wars. Again, central to this
argument is the Army’s belief that we must continue
to focus on MCO as a priority versus restructuring
for counterinsurgency (COIN). Secretary Gates has
stated “asymmetric warfare will be the mainstay of the
contemporary battlefield for some time. These conflicts
will be fundamentally political in nature, and require
the application of all elements of national power.”45
Another CBO proposal was to integrate stabilization
force packages into BCTs or create multifunctional
stabilization battalion task forces. Units would consist
of a mix of combat and support elements that could
execute security as well as infrastructure repair at the
local level. A counterargument to this concept was
that advisory and assistance tasks are normally senior
officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) heavy.
The question becomes what do you do with the other
300-400 young enlisted soldiers?
In December 2006, Andrew Krepinevich produced
a study that examined eight possible scenarios for
future Stability Operations.46 They included:
1. Large State Failure—Indonesia or Nigeria.
2. Nuclear State Failure—Pakistan.
3. Ambiguous Aggression—Kenya.
4. Pandemic—Mexico.
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5. Global Commerce Raiding.
6. Narco Trafficking—Colombia.
7. Great Power Proxy War—Central Asia.
8. Creating Positions of Strength—Afghanistan.
Based on these possible future conflicts, Krepinevich
developed recommendations to address requirements
for stability operations as well as training and advisory
units. His world view believes there is a lack of peer or
near-peer adversaries and presents IW and COIN as a
low-risk opportunity to designate these types of warfare
as the primary mission. As such, they then should be
given the appropriate force structure to function in that
role. His organizational vision includes:
• Forward Liaison and Assistance Groups
(FLAGs): SSTR-optimized brigades to conduct
“ink spot” stabilization operations—45 brigades
(27 Active Component, 3 USMC, 15 National
Guard).
• Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs):
Headquarters with additional economic and
political staff; two-thirds command; 300-3,000
troops.
• Security Training and Equipping Groups
(STEGs): one-half command; 2,000-3,000 troops.
Their mission is to train and equip military and
police forces, and ministries. This is described as
Multi-National Security Transition CommandIraq (MNSTC-I) in a box.
• Civil Operations, Reconstruction, and Development Support Groups (CORDSGs): one-half
command; 4,000-5,000 troops. Their mission
is to advise, mentor, and support nonsecurity
structures such as civil administration, rule of
law, health, and economic development.
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Again, the Army’s position is similar to the R&S
divisions. The commitment of almost all of the Army’s
combat power to R&S tasks is not prudent.
On February 21, 2008, the “G-35-SSO Internal Study
on Army Civil Affairs in Full Spectrum Operations”
produced some stunning analysis on the way ahead
for CA in Stability Operations. Army CA realized
it “lacks the capability and capacity to support the
Army through all phases of Full Spectrum Operations
in a Joint, Interagency and Multinational (JIM)
environment.”47 Study members’ recommendations
seek to transform SO from the strategic level down
to the tactical level. They view the current conditions
facing CA in the following context:
• Era of Persistent Conflict:
		 — Operations among the people
		 — Unpredictable, asymmetric threats
		 — Must operate across all phases of the war
(Phase 0 through Phase 5)
		 — Integrate operations within the five Civil
Sectors
			 o Applicable capabilities from military
strategic national level through tactical
level
• Whole of Government Approach:
		 — Integrating military-civilian teams
		 — A pervasive information environment
		 — Leading to conflict resolution
• Evolving Policies
• Evolving Doctrine
		 — Simultaneous or sequential offense, defense,
and stability operations, Army, Joint, U.S.
Government.
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Figure 4 shows the overall relationship of U.S.
Government requirements and CA means to meet
those ends. The design provides for the integration of
reserve component soldiers with unique skills into an
interagency approach. It provides scalable capabilities
based on the security situation and/or conditionsbased intervention. The concept provides for quick
deploying/modular formations while maximizing the
power of information in operations. It also allows the
United States to offer “best practices” to indigenous
government and host nation leadership.48

Figure 4. Civil Affairs “Means” as an Element of
Full Spectrum Operations.49
The design change (see Figure 5) calls for realistic
restructuring to make Army CA viable again at all
levels of policy, strategy, and execution. That includes
adding personnel to commands at the strategic as well
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as operational levels. The operational concept focuses
on deployable teams that possess various tailorable
capabilities. Ministry Assistance Teams are designed
to provide three stages of capabilities similar to S/
CRS. The concept also provides for a support staff that
provides proponency as well as a Civil Affairs Center
of Excellence for reachback capabilities.

Figure 5. Recommended CA Force Design Concept.50
Training and Advisory Units.
In June 2007, U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel John
Nagl advocated the establishment of a permanent
20,000-member Advisory Corps. This Corps would
train and advise military and police forces from the
Ministry level down to battalion level. This concept
is based on the future requirements for Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM (OEF) as well as for future COIN fights.
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Currently, the Army uses an ad-hoc structure of senior
NCOs and officers to manage these tasks. The Army
stood down the 1st Infantry Division at Fort Riley,
Kansas, as well as two brigades, and developed the
training program for senior NCOs and officers for this
mission. This was an inefficient use of combat power
but the only real option the Army had at that time.
Major General Anthony Cuculo, the Chief of Army
Public Affairs, reportedly rejected the notion of a
permanent advisory corps noting the capabilities to
be provided by an advisory corps are already being
provided by Special Forces.51 Lieutenant General Peter
Chiarelli stated, “The Special Forces do this mission
well on the scale that is normally required for TSC
and other routine foreign internal defense missions.”52
Yet, the IW JOC clearly articulates that GPF will build
surrogate and partner nation security force capacity
on a global scale. This task far exceeds Special Forces’
capability even with the addition of Special Forces
battalions that is currently proposed. Secretary Gates
emphasizes “the standing up and mentoring of
indigenous army and police—once the province of
Special Forces—is now a key mission for the military
as a whole.”53
In spite of the confusion and unified understanding
of roles and missions among senior leaders, Chief of
Staff of the Army General George Casey directed
TRADOC to identify shortfalls regarding TSC, military engagement as well as PBC in our combatant
commands. The intent of the study was to develop an
operational concept and range of organization designs
to meet those gaps. It appears that the Army elevated
the requirement for the training and advisory mission
to a core task just as DOD Directive 3000.5 elevated the
stability mission to a core Army mission.
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In response, the Army created the Theater Military
Advisory Assistance Group—Forward (TMAAG-F)
(Figures 6 and 7). The TMAAG-F is designed to provide
TSC activities during the period of Shaping Operations
(Phase 0) and would not be a crisis response force.54
It would contribute to the theater-wide security
cooperation activities of the U.S. embassy-based
MILGROUPS55 by providing a standing structure to
execute specific TSC tasks, as tasked by the Geographic
Combatant Commander (GCC) and Theater Army/
Army Service Component Command (ASCC). . . .
The TMAAG-F would consist of a small organic
administrative headquarters with assigned training
teams and focus on the Host Nations’ land forces at the
brigade and below level.56

Figure 6. Proposed Army TMAAG Location within
TSC Structure.57
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Figure 7. Proposed TMAAG-F Organizational
Design.58
Each GCC would have three Training Teams (TTs)
of 22 personnel each to use in theater. The organization
contains no operational or strategic structure, nor
does it provide a proponency office for TRADOC or
the Army to improve overall efficiencies and manage
costs.
Specifically, this design does not provide a
single entity charged with keeping our doctrine,
organizational design, training, leader development,
materiel, personnel policies, and facility design
(DOTLMPF).
Additionally, the design fails to address the
requirements directed in DOD 3000.5 for Stability
Operations and as identified by the Army’s G-35-SSO’s
internal study. This includes the requirements for
Police Trainers (PTs) as well as Governance Advisors.
The Army also states the TMAAG is just like a Special
Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) team.
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This is far from the truth. The TMAAG, as part of
the GPF, is a focused specialty that enables soldiers
to go back and forth from the Global Force pool. The
cultural understanding, relationships, and operational
experience is an incredible combat multiplier for our
GPF in future TSC operations as well as SO.
Another option the Army is considering is
expanding MILGRPs. This is a great idea and should be
part of the overall relook at our engagement strategy.
However, MILGRP expansion alone without some
form of TMAAG is short-sighted. MILGRPs do not
offer the GCC any additional flexible deterrent options.
MILGRPs are located in specific countries in which
the United States has normalized relations. They are
normally not located in failed or failing states. These
are the exact countries the U.S. Government is targeting
through a comprehensive TSC and engagement
strategy. The TMAAGs and Regional Ministry Teams
can surge in accordance with DoD, DoS, or GCC
guidance on a selected country and develop partner
capacity.
The TMAAG and governance advisors are
complementary efforts to both ODA and MILGRP
efforts. Unfortunately, on March 22, 2008, HQDA
decided that the TMAAG, as designed, is not an Army
requirement (at least not at this point).59
The CSA believes our forces are the best trainers in the
world and explored the possibility that another alternative approach to building partnership capacity could
be accomplished by using the Army Force Generation
(ARFORGEN) process through the assignment and focus
of a brigade combat team. However, he also indicated
that he recognized the skills associated with working
with indigenous forces and how that would be good for
the conventional army.60
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Unfortunately, the problem with aligning BCTs
according to geographical regions faces the same
challenges as the “full-spectrum” argument. The Army
is in a period of persistent conflict. It relies on the
ARFORGEN model to provide the right forces, with
the right training, at the right time. The lack of trained
senior advisor cadre with cultural understanding and
language capability will be ad-hoc at best. Also this
fails to take into account the current mission overload
and “jack of all trades” mentality.
The Marines have addressed the future in their
Long War strategy. The strategy clearly identifies
the requirement for “new capabilities” such as the
Security-Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Force
(SC-MAGTF). The SC-MAGTF is designed as a Marine
Expeditionary Unit but task organized for security
cooperation and civil military operations.61 They will
focus on building partner nation security capacity and
supporting partner nation security efforts. This is no
different than aligning BCTs within the ARFORGEN
model on specific Areas of Responsibility (AORs).
What is different is the development of Marine Corps
advisors. The Marines, through experiences in Iraq
and Afghanistan, have realized there is a requirement
for a more robust SFA capability. In October 2007,
the Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group
(MCTAG) was commissioned by the Commandant.62
The advisors will receive special training and will
interface with partner nations assisting SC-MAGTFs
and U.S. country teams and attaches. The teams will
train with SC-MAGTFs. SC-MAGTFs will also include
assignment of Foreign Area Officers (FAOs), Regional
Affairs Officers (RFOs), and linguists as well as officers
and NCOs with academic backgrounds in specific
regions.63
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Although the Army has far superior resources
to execute this mission, the Marines understand the
importance of engagement and what it means to
our foreign policy. The Marine concept still lacks
the incorporation of police and foreign governance
training, but it does recognize the need for permanent
advisors to meet the new challenges of today’s security
environment.
DOCTRINAL CONSIDERATIONS
This paper has identified the Stability Operation
policy requirements and Army shortcomings in
accordance with NSPD 44 as well as DoD 3000.5.
Before attempting to clarify the capacity and capability
gaps, it is important to understand what Joint and
Army doctrine says about the Army’s roles and
responsibilities. Additionally, what tools are currently
used by the GCC in TSC and PCB operations?
Foreign nations must develop their own plans for
growth and stability before they request U.S. assistance.
The military calls that plan the Internal Defense and
Development (IDAD) plan. It is defined as the “full range
of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth
and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and
insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions
(political, economic, social, and military) that respond
to the needs of society.”64 (See Figure 8.)
“Commensurate with U.S. policy goals, the focus
of all U.S. Foreign Internal Defense (FID) efforts is to
support the Host Nations (HN’s) program of IDAD.”65
FID is defined as “the participation by civilian and
military agencies of a government in any of the action
programs taken by another government or other
designated organization to free and protect its society
from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.”66 Most
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Figure 8. IDAD Strategy Model.67
likely the needs of that country will be economic,
social, political, and informational. The United States
will then employ a combination of both soft and hard
power options to support the HN. So then what are the
tools of the FID trade?
Military doctrine addresses indirect and direct
support to FID.68 The indirect approach contains many
of the options typically used in TSC activities. Typical
activities include multinational training and exercises,
multinational education, military-to-military contacts,
humanitarian and civic assistance, and other activities
such as exercise related construction, intelligence,
security cooperation, information operations, command and control programs. Security Assistance (SA)
is also part of TSC.
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SA is a group of programs authorized by the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export
Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes
by which the United States provides defense articles,
military training, and other defense-related services by
grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national
policies and objectives.69

DoD defines Security Cooperation as:
the interactions with foreign defense establishments to
build defense relationships that promote specific U.S.
security interests, develop allied and friendly military
capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations,
and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency
access to a host nation.70

PCB is defined as the targeted efforts to improve
the collective capabilities and performance of DoD and
its partners. Additionally, FM 3-0 directs the Army to
meet its Full-Spectrum requirements. These are civil
security, support to governance, provision of essential
services, support to economic development and
infrastructure, and civil control. So what does this all
mean? It suggests that our doctrine is consistent with
national policy.
Figure 9 describes the asymmetric paradigm and
conditions the military faces during all phases of
conflict. The importance of Shaping Operations during
Phase 1 Insurgencies is critical. General Charles Wald,
USAF (Ret) describes “Phase 0 (Shaping Operations)
as a campaign unto itself . . . and the preventative focus
of Phase 0 is less costly in (both blood and treasure)
than a reactive approach to a crisis.”71
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Figure 9. FID Paradigm across Full Spectrum
Insurgencies.72
So does the Army have all the tools required to
execute Full-Spectrum Operations throughout the
construct of FID and TSC operations from Phase 0 to
Phase 5? The answer is simply no. The U.S. Army lacks
the minimum force structure to meet current or future
requirements for stabilization, training, and advising.
Capability and Capacity Gaps.
As outlined above, the U.S. Government’s ability
to execute Partner Capacity Building, Security Force
Assistance, Theater Security Operations, Foreign
Internal Defense, Irregular Warfare, and SSTR is
critical as we face a time of persistent conflict. There
are capability gaps beyond the military requirement
such as police and military training, regional and
local governance, and civil works type operations. In
the absence of interagency capability, DoD and the
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Army, as a major subset, must develop these kinds
of capabilities. Additionally, these requirements will
likely increase over time as the United States builds
the Africa Command (AFRICOM) and the associated
challenges of that AOR. So capacity is an issue as our
nation faces a continued terrorist threat. How does
our military meet both GWOT requirements and
engagement worldwide?
THE PROPONENCY REQUIREMENT
As outlined in the Joint Center for International
Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) Draft working
Paper (March 2008), there is a “requirement for a
forcing function to unify the efforts of the services, DoD,
and the U.S. Government to establish a meaningful
Security Force Assistance (SFA) capability with
sufficient capacity to execute our national strategy that
is sustainable over time.”73
SFA is synonymous with train, advise, and assist.74
SFA and PCB are virtually identical. This “Proponent”
should be joint and interagency in nature. Because the
Army maintains a robust military, military police, and
CA capability, the Army should play a significant role
in the execution of these tasks. Without a proponent
for Stability Operations, TSC, SFA and PCB operations,
from the strategic to tactical level, we will continue to
attack this complex problem in a piecemeal fashion,
resulting in incomplete proposals. To amplify the need
to establish proponency first, the Army’s Draft White
Paper (February 2008) describes the need for a Stability
Operations and Training Assistance Proponent very
well. Our current structure for language, cultural
studies, military training teams, provincial reconstruction teams, etc., are ad hoc at best.
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For example, the Army proponent for language
contracts (linguists) is the DA G-2, while the DA G-3
is the designated member of the DoD language board.
The Secretary of the Army is executive agent for
Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center
(DLIFLC) and has designated DA G-3 as lead. The DA
G-3/5/7 has designated G3-Training as the Senior
Language Authority for the Army. DLIFLC language
instruction is managed by TRADOC G-3/5/7. The
TRADOC G-2 runs the University of Foreign Military
and Cultural Studies (UFMCS) as a TRADOC school
and has proponency for Red Teams. The U.S. Army
Intelligence School and Center (USAISC) sponsors the
TRADOC Culture Center and has training proponency
for cultural understanding. FORSCOM currently
trains the Transition Teams (TT) and, with the State
Department, trains the Provincial Reconstruction
Teams (PRT). The Combined Arms Center is conducting
work on behalf of CG, TRADOC, and Headquarters
Department of the Army (HQDA) to develop the
TMAAG-Fs as well as the enduring training concept for
TTs and PRTs. This does not include the list of current
organizations working within Stability Operations to
one extent or another—the Peacekeeping and Stability
Operations Institute (PKSOI) at Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania; the Counter Insurgency Center (COIN)
at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and the Joint Center for
International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA), also
at Fort Leavenworth. Additionally, as the USAR Civil
Affairs (USAR CA) units and Psychological Operations
(USAR PSYOPS) units no longer fall under U.S. Army
Special Operations Command, they essentially have
lost their proponent.75
Within this myriad of ongoing activities, no
single proponent integrates all activities to provide
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a common overarching direction and can justify/
prioritize requirements for engagement and stability
operations. Without that voice, there is no funding or
synchronization and little effectiveness. In addition
to the proponency, there are many other gaps in U.S.
capability to further U.S. interests from the strategic to
tactical levels.
STABILIZATION, ADVISING, AND TRAINING
CAPABILITY/CAPACITY GAPS AND
REQUIREMENTS
• Strategic National Level:
		 — Advocate the creation of a dedicated U.S.
Government office to develop top-level
policies for SFA to coordinate actions across
the U.S. Government in support of the
National Security Strategy.76
		 — Establish Joint and Service Proponents
to synchronize actions across Doctrine,
Organizational, Training, Leader, Material,
Personnel, and Facility construct (DOTLMPF) and institutionalize lessons learned.
Unity of effort will not occur without
responsibility and authority.
		 — Develop scalable organizations to train and
advise foreign security forces and security
institutions (unilaterally or as part of civilianmilitary) teams in permissive and contested
areas.77
		 — Propose comprehensive legislative changes
(including the Police Training Prohibition)
to enhance operational effectiveness of PCB
and SFA related Authorities in Section 1206
of the FY 2006 National Defense Authority
Act and DoS Title 22 Legislation.78
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— Develop funding streams (either Title 10 or
22 or new) that facilitate long-term execution
of Phase 0 to Phase V operations using
TMAAGs and Ministry Teams (MTs).
— Develop DoD/DoS Memorandum of Agreement on specific responsibilities for Shaping
Operations through Stability Operations.
— Build upon existing expertise; establish a
Joint-Interagency-Intergovernmental-Multinational Advisory and Assistance Center
of Excellence (COE) to include a Joint Interagency Foreign Governance Center of Excellence.
— Establish a Joint and Interagency Training
Center of Excellence for Stability Operations
and Training Assistance.
— Advocate reestablishing the USIA to
positively engage U.S. and international
opinion regarding SFA operations and
activities.79
— Develop incentive programs such as focused
recruitment, retention bonuses, specialty
pays, and promotion incentives to build,
enhance, and retain GPF personnel with
TMAAG and MT skills.80
— Develop educational opportunities for GPF
personnel by undertaking tours of duty
with foreign security institutions, other U.S.
departments and agencies, international
organizations, and NGOs.
— Adjust Professional Military Education
(PME) to facilitate social science and cultural
understanding instruction.
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• Strategic Theater Level:
		 — Future capacity efforts focus on Phase 0
while current capacity efforts focus on Phase
IV. The capacity must be able to expand and
contract based on demand to cover steady
state to major stability operations and have
the capability to rotate forces.81
• SFA and PCB activities require institutionalization:82
		 — Maintain expeditionary units organized,
trained, and equipped to provide civil security, restore essential governmental functions, repair key infrastructure necessary to
government functions to sustain human life,
and reform or rebuild indigenous security
institutions; indigenous, international, or
U.S. civilian personnel can do so.83
		 — Train and advise foreign security forces and
partners at the institutional, operational,
and tactical levels to strengthen indigenous,
irregular, and traditional warfare capabilities.84
		 — Develop pool of active Army CA specialists to
serve as staff principals on both strategic and
operational level commands and agencies.85
		 — CA or General Purpose Forces MOSs and
ASIs should be modified to meet the new
reality of foreign governance challenges and
ministries. This list should include but is not
limited to public health, internally displaced
personnel and refugee resettlement, power
generation, public works, culture, public
integrity, water resources, agriculture, defense, interior, justice and courts, human
rights, transportation, communications, environment, youth and sports, education,
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banks and financial institutions, trade, industry and minerals, science and technology, housing and construction, and planning and development.86
		 — Develop GPF active duty CA with the requisite
MOSs and ASIs to integrate into permanent
force structure and nest with follow-on S/
CRS assets as the security environment
permits.87
		 — Significantly increase the training and
education of CA. Specifically, how to train,
advise, assist, lead, mentor, and educate
ministries or local governments.88
		 — Develop clinical or cyclical testing to maintain
CA proficiency especially in ministerial type
operations.89
• Military Operational Level:
		 — Develop regionally oriented TMAAG (Army
and Police capabilities) and National/
Regional Ministry Teams (NMTs/RMTs) as
a “Ranger” like organization with specified
command opportunities.90
		 — “Operationalize” culture or language training
within the GPF Army through service in
TMAAG, NMT, and RMT organizations.
		 — Direct development of effective personnel
mechanisms to assess, train, educate, employ,
and track advisory and ministry assistance
personnel.91
		 — Provide brigade and battalion command
and CSM opportunities for officers and
NCOs who pursue opportunities in this
capability. Ensure personnel are given equal
opportunity for advancement. An advisor
must “escape the nagging feeling that he is a
second class citizen.”92
35

• Tactical Level:
		 — Review procedures to obtain qualified and
reliable linguist contractors in a contingency
environment.
FORCE STRUCTURE OVERVIEW—A NEW
PARADIGM
As Secretary Gates has stated, our armed forces
must take a different look at our operational design
and how we can best address the needs for PCB and
SFA throughout the continuum of conflict especially
during TSC operations. The United States European
Command Posture Statement of 2006 stated that
“proactive peacetime engagement activities reassure
allies and partners, promote stability and mitigate the
conditions that lead to conflict. We base our strategies
on the principle that it is much more cost effective to
prevent conflict than it is to stop it once it has started.”93
If it is that important, then it is time to give Geographic
Combatant Commanders more tools to fight in this
asymmetric environment.
There are several imperatives that must be
incorporated into the design:
• First, there must be a significant mind shift
among senior governmental and military leaders
in regard to force structure for TMAAGs, Police
Advise and Assist Training Teams (PAATTs),
as well as National and Regional Ministry
Teams. It is not an argument of getting away
from the Army’s core competency or fighting
and winning our nation’s wars but of having a
minimal effective capability within our Army.
By having a small core of Army, Police, and
Ministry Trainers, the United States will have
a professional, trained, and focused capability
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that is not ad hoc or temporary in nature and
can complement MCO.
• Establish a Joint or Service Proponent responsible for DOTLM-PF and statutory (i.e., flexibility to Title 10 and 22, expand GCC TSC discretionary funding, as well as expanding Section
1206 authorities) requirements.
• Force Design. (This paper will assume that
the Army has the lead in the development
of structure. It will not attempt to create Joint
positions throughout the organization although
ultimately that is preferred.)
		 — Leverage existing structure from DoD and
DoS to build capacity and limit manpower
bill requirements (i.e., combine S/CRS,
PKSOI, and JCISFA, UFMCS. Reorganize
CA, etc.). Most of the capability already
exists in our government.
		 —  Establish COEs for Stability/Foreign Governance Operations, Advisor Operations as
well as training. Institutionalize DOTLM-PF
construct.
		 — Design must include national/theater to
battalion/local level capability that is capable
of planning and executing in both peace
and wartime. Capability will be scalable in
nature.
		 — Design will correspond to GCCs AOR.
		 — Units must be able to operate in an
environment that is permissive as well as
nonpermissive.
		 — Cultural and language training is operationalized throughout organization.
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FORCE STRUCTURE OPERATIONAL
CONCEPT—AN OPTION
The Security Advisory and Assistance Command
(SAAC) (see Figure 10) is the capstone proponent that
serves as the Joint Center of Excellence for Stability
Operations, PCB, SFA, and SSTR operations. JCISFA
would embed into this command and facilitate
proponency for the SAAC. Additionally, SAAC would
work in close coordination with the Security Force
Assistance and other Security Assistance programs to
optimize requirements. If required, and under future
reorganization, these commands could fall under
SAAC to gain synergies. The commands and their
capabilities are:
• The U.S. Army Security Assistance Command
(USASAC) implements approved U.S. Army
security assistance programs, including Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) of defense articles and
services to eligible foreign governments. The
command is also responsible for the entire
process of initial fielding to management of each
FMS case in approximately 168 countries.94
• The Security Assistance Training Directorate
(SATD) is a subordinate element of TRADOC
and the G-3/5/7. It functions as the Army
program manager for U.S. Government-authorized and DOD-executed Security Assistance
Training Programs (SATP). It provides Armymanaged training to approved countries and
international military students in CONUS and
outside continental United States (OCONUS)
in support of combatant commands (COCOM),
Army component commanders, and HQDA
security cooperation objectives. Assists the CG,
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TRADOC as executive agent (EA) for security
assistance training.95
• SATD includes the Security Assistance Training
Field Activity (SATFA) at Fort Monroe,
Virginia, and the Security Assistance Training
Management Organization (SATMO) at Fort
Bragg, North Carolina. SATFA manages the
training of over 9,000 international students in
nearly 10,000 seats per year. Students come from
165 countries to 90 Army-managed training
activities, including 22 TRADOC schools.
SATMO deploys nearly 400 personnel in 69
teams to over 37 countries each year to train
international personnel. SATMO maintains
10 PCS teams in CENTCOM, EUCOM and
SOUTHCOM.96

Figure 10. Security Advisory and Assistance
Command.97
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SAAC is a TRADOC Table of Distribution and
Allowances (TDA) unit that falls under the Combined
Arms Center and consists of approximately 1,300
personnel. It is commanded by a major general who is
responsible for all DoD SFA and PCB issues as it relates
to TSC, SSTR, COIN, FID, UW, IW, and MCO. SAAC,
as the proponent, would conduct long-range planning
to ensure the combined capabilities and capacities
of other Services, as well as OGAs, meet future
operational requirements. In a sense SAAC would
attempt to, through coordination, facilitate a Joint
Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) for the interagency
in cooperation with the DoS and National Security
Council.
SAAC also would manage DOTLM-PF for the
interagency and joint force and work legislative
and funding issues with Congress. Most authorities
regarding SFA and PCB were designed during the
Cold War and therefore do not offer timely response
in our current environment. The command would
conduct liaison with other Services, allies, OGAs,
and U.S. country teams, as well as the Geographic
Combatant Commanders. The SAAC would either
integrate or coordinate with Joint Forces Command
J7/9, Naval Expeditionary Combat Command-ETC,
MARSOCs-Foreign Military Training Units, U.S. Army
Special Forces, USAFSOC-FID Squadron as well as the
DoS-S/CRS. Additionally, this command could assist
Security Cooperation-Marine Air Ground Task Forces
(SC-MAGTFs) with additional capability or support
during Advisory and Assistance missions.
In addition to its Title 10 responsibilities and
generating force requirements, SAAC would contain
a deployable command headquarters called the
Military Advisory Assistance Command (MAAC)
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commanded by a Brigadier General (See Figure 11).
The MAAC consists of a deployable Headquarters
and Training Group with coordinating responsibilities
to the TMAAGs. The TMAAG remains an assigned
and theater committed unit under each ASCC. The
SAAC would also oversee the Interagency Foreign
Governance Center of Excellence (IFGC). The IFGC
would be lead by a civilian Senior Executive Service
officer. The IFGC would contain a Deployable Joint
National Ministry Team and maintain coordination
with the Regional Ministry Teams (RMT) that are
subordinate to the ASCCs and partners with TMAAGs
during tactical operations.

Figure 11. Military Advisory and Assistance
Command.98
The MAAC is a comparable to small deployable
MNSTC-I and will consist of approximately 116
personnel. At home station, it would manage the
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daily assessment/training of advisors (Training
Brigade) and assist deployments of all TMAAG and
RMTs. If more than one TMAAG or RMT is required
for operations, the MAAC can deploy as part of the
JFC’s force package. In addition to executing security
cooperation tasks, it can also, under the proper
authorities, conduct combat advising or contingency
operations. The MAAC assists Regional TMAAGs
in AOR-wide planning, coordination and support of
GCC TSCP requirements and coordinates request for
forces with FORSCOM for assets beyond their organic
capability. Additionally, the MAAC would work for
the Joint Force Commander as well as host country
and U.S. Country Team or MILGROUP. Its functions
would include assisting the GCCs and subordinate
ASCCs in professionalizing Foreign Security Forces
(FSF), conducting traditional Foreign Internal Defense
(FID), executing Security Assistance operations (FMS,
IMET, MTTs, etc.), developing partner nation FSF Title
10 capabilities—legal and legislative authorities—
fostering interagency operability, in addition to
combat advising.99 The headquarters is organized as a
battle rostered headquarters with manning document
additions from the ASCC. Specific manning would
come from both the active and reserve components. The
MAAC would act as seed-corn for larger operations in
the required AOR and determine when scalable or adhoc units were required.
The Training Brigade (see Figure 12) of the SAAC
consists of a TRADOC TDA organization that is
supervised by the MAAC (currently the Army is moving
the Fort Riley Advisor Training Brigade capability
to JRTC and Fort Polk, Louisiana). The Brigade size
element of approximately 900 personnel will consist
of a standard staff, with a Training Support Battalion
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(TSB), Individual Training Battalions (ITB), Operations
Group (OG), and the University of Foreign and
Cultural Studies (relocated from Fort Leavenworth).
Additionally, the Training Brigade will partner with
a U.S. Army Reserve Training Support Brigade (TSB).
The TSB will provide surge instructor capacity during
contingency operations so that an active division or
brigade does not have to shut down in order to support
the advisor training mission.

Figure 12. SAAC Training Brigade Organization.100
What is different from the current TT Brigade at
Fort Riley is that the Individual Training Battalion
will assess each candidate to include background
screening, a psychological profile, medical and physical screening and a selection board. The criticality of
this assessment is paramount to ensure our best are
conducting engagements for America. Additionally,
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the Individual Training Battalion will train Army and
Police, as well as Governance Advisors. Skills sets
required for each advisor will include subject matter
expert skills, combat and advisor skills, and advanced
individual training such as language and cultural
studies. Language and cultural training will focus on
regional orientation by national priorities. The ITB
will also contain elements from the interagency to
train both civilian and military personnel in Embassy,
USAID, DoS, Treasury, Justice, and other interagency
components in regard to SFA and PCB. Additionally,
the ITB will facilitate AOR familiarization tours similar
to that of Foreign Area Officers to gain situational
awareness and understanding.
Another operational function for the MAAC is to
retain a linkage between the ASCC and the Interagency
Governance Center. Additionally, it would manage
contracted and local hire personnel for the teams at
home station or when deployed.
The Interagency Foreign Governance Center of
Excellence would consist of numerous agencies,
departments, and civilian think tank representatives
as well as military personnel that span numerous
government agencies and responsibilities (see Figure
13). Additionally, Joint Civil Affairs personnel,
elements of the S/CRS and the Army’s Peacekeeping
and Stability Operations Institute and others would
man the IFGC to reduce the bill-payer requirements.
The center will contain approximately 200 personnel.
The center’s purpose is to study and advise on fullspectrum stability and security operations as well as
synchronize SFA and PCB. S/CRS currently focuses
only on Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations
(Phase V). There is no single central coordination
and management agency that spans control from
steady state to major stability operations in regards to
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governance issues. Therefore, the requirement for the
Joint IFGC exists.

Figure 13. Joint Interagency Foreign Governance
Center of Excellence.101
Additionally, the IFGC is responsible for joint and
interagency concept development, experimentation,
and analysis for FID, PCB, and SFA. The organization
could provide policy recommendations through the
SAAC Commander to the Country Reconstruction and
Stabilization Group (CRSG) at the State Department.
The CRSG could then make recommendations to principals on strategic planning guidance. They could assist
the NSC in wargaming of interagency plans as well as
facilitating the synchronization of the diplomatic and
informational, as well as economic, elements of national power. The IFGC also works authorities issues
(Title 10/22 and 1206) and provides reachback
capabilities for deployed National and Regional
Ministry Teams. The Center is also capable of facilitating
the development of DoD/DoS Memorandums of
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Agreement, developing DOTLM-PF solutions for
foreign governance assistance as well as providing
themes and messages to positively engage U.S. and
international opinion regarding PCB, SFA, and SSTR
operations.
The design of the IFGC includes coordination with
a deployable Joint National Ministry Team assigned to
JFCOM as well as a Red Team. The Red Team would
challenge plans, operations, concepts, organizations,
and capabilities that are developed by the IFGC as
well as the MAAC from an asymmetric adversary
perspective.
The Joint National Ministry Team (JNMT) (Figure
14) works for JFCOM but is the operational arm of
the IFGC. It is manned in a Joint Manning Document
under JFCOM and consists of 116 personnel. The
Team Director is a DoS representative. The Deputy is
a 38A (Civil Affairs) Joint qualified colonel. The JNMT
consists of senior level experts in broad and diverse
governance functions from both the military and civilian sectors. The JNMT conducts national level planning
and deployment capability for the military in conjunction with the S/CRS Integration Planning Cell (IPC)
(See Figure 15). They can assist GCCs in developing
their TSCPs and facilitate RMTs deployment and execution. The unit would participate in national level exercises as a full-spectrum Ministry Team capability, and
during contingency operations, the unit would deploy
with the MAAC and form the core governance function
for the Joint Force Commander, Embassy, or U.S. Government presence. Military personnel would assume
most of the capability during combat operations and
transition to full capability (i.e., ARC, SRC, CRC,
or assigned personnel) as hostilities decreased (See
Figure 16). Again, it is important to note that the ARC,
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SRC, and CRC are post-conflict capabilities and are not
focused on steady state TSC operations.

Figure 14. Joint National Ministry Team.102

Figure 15. Revised S/CRS Interagency
Management System103
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Figure 16. Civilian Response and Reserve System.104
Regional Ministry Teams (see Figure 17) are
assigned to each GCCs’ ASCC, and partnered with the
TMAAG for training and operations when feasible.
They are capable of spanning advisory capability from
the local to the provincial level. During MCO, the RMT
can be augmented by additional CA Task Forces or
by ARC, SRC, or CRC based on combat conditions.
Like the JNMT, the RMT is lead by a civilian Team
Leader partnered with a CA lieutenant colonel deputy.
Again, military personnel would assume most of the
capability during combat operations and transition to
full capability with its civilian counterparts as hostilities
decreased. The organization does not contain as many
functions as the JNMT but can provide extensive services to a Host Nation. The RMT can be task organized
with engineers, other CA units or combat forces in order
to accomplish a TSC or FID type mission. The RMTs
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would work closely with the S/CRS Field Advance
Civilian Team during R&S operations.

Figure 17. Regional Ministry Team.105
The TMAAG (see Figure 18) is a subordinate
assigned theater committed unit to each Army Service
Component Commander. This calls for five regionally
aligned TMAAGs (all except for NORTHCOM). The
TMAAG consists of a Headquarters Detachment
(14 personnel), a Rear Detachment (4 personnel), a
Human Terrain Team (5 personnel), and the TMAAG
Headquarters itself (47 personnel).
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Figure 18. Theater Military Advisory and Assistance
Group Structure.106
The TMAAG Headquarters itself can execute
Division or Corps level TT missions (see Figure 19). It
receives its missions from the ASCC and coordinates
with the MILGRP or JFC. The TMAAG has coordination
responsibilities with the RMT if deployed and can
work for the TMAAG Commander if assigned as a JTF.
The TMAAG and associated units provide additional
capacity to SF units and can work for other JTFs such as
a Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (MEB) if required.
TMAAGs or their elements may be placed under tactical
control (TACON)/operational control (OPCON) to
BCTs for Combat Advisory missions as well. The
TMAAG is optimized to provide additive TSC and
SFA/PCB capability enabling SF units to focus on HN
Special Operations training. They may serve to train and
advise Host Nation conventional land forces, provide
unit evaluations and assessments, conduct in-country
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assessments and train the trainer missions, procure
U.S. defense articles, conduct multinational education,
and facilitate military-to-military exchanges, to name
a few. The TMAAG is capable of assisting in other
activities such as exercise related construction with the
RMT, intelligence security cooperation, information
operations, and command and control programs.

Figure 19. TMAAG Headquarters.107
TMAAGs may also form specialized BAATTs (i.e.,
Border Police, Field Artillery, or Logistic Support etc.)
to complete a function for a host nation. These special
teams are not limited to Army functions. The TMAAG
could support HN aircraft training, port operations,
or border security as well, with proper augmentation
from other components.
The TMAAG and RMT can operate under two
different Command and Control (C2) relationships.
First, under an advise/assist mission the TMAAG or
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RMT may be OPCON to a JTF or Ambassador while
advisory control (ADCON) through the ASCC. The
ASCC will coordinate with the Chief of Mission to
determine the OPCON/TACON command relationships. During MCO, units are TACON to a Corps,
a Division, or even a BCT, while remaining ADCON to
the ASCC until the MAAC is deployed.
The TMAAG normatively commands three Brigade
Advisory/Assist Training Teams (BdAATT) consisting
of three Battalions of Battalion Advise/Assist Training
Teams (BAATTs) and three Police Advise/Assist
Training Teams (PAATT) (See Figures 20-22) in order
to maintain an ARFORGEN-like deployment cycle. The
TMAAG analyzes missions and assigns subordinate
teams to execute tasks within its capability. The TMAAG
will provide LNO capability in order to facilitate
operations. The TMAAG is commanded by a centrally
selected colonel while BdAATTs are commanded by
centrally selected lieutenant colonels.

Figure 20. Brigade Advisory/Assist Training Team.108
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Figure 21. Battalion Advisory/Assist Training
Team.109

Figure 22. Police Advisory/Assist Training Team.110
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It is important to note that through the Police
Advisory Department of the IFGC, civilian police
trainers are provided to the PAATs. This is a
critical component to HN success in teaching topics
such as patrolling, community policing, criminal
investigations, etc. Given the proper legal authorities
in the new asymmetric environment, PAATTs become
a significant combat multiplier for any IDAD program
and for the TMAAGs TSC capabilities.
OTHER DOTLM-PF CONSIDERATIONS
• Doctrine:
		 — Synthesize a joint publication that discusses
the employment, capabilities, standards,
responsibilities, terms, and other considerations for military, police, and governance
SFA and BPC operations.
		 — Capture lessons learned and tactics, techniques, and procedures from past and recent
history of military, police, and governance
advisory missions.
		 — Create a menu of new and traditional shaping
activities for SFA and BPC.
		 — Establish Human Terrain Team data bases.
		 — Create standard military, police and governance readiness assessment reports.
• Organization:
		 — DoD completes a comprehensive interagency
study on organizations to include police and
governance structure.
		 — Gain congressional understanding and
funding for the benefits of SFA/BPC activities.
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— Gain authorities to conduct police advising
and training to meet current asymmetric
threat.
		 —  Establish interagency proponency for all
phases of SFA, BPC, and stability operations.
		 — Institutionalize minimal capability through
proposed design.
		 — Analyze requirements or possibilities for
contractor supported positions (i.e., currently
a requirement for civilian police as members
of PAATTs).
		 — Baseline organization is scalable with augmentation. Develop phased requirements
for OPLANs of follow-on TMAAG or RMT
forces for the GCC.
		 — TMAAGs and RMTs will depend on ASCC
to reduce redundancies for administrative
functions such as SJA, IG, and comptroller.
• Training:
		 — Increase depth of advisor training through
PME and practical experience.
		 — Develop detailed training plans for TT during
contingency operations.
		 — Develop steady state training plans for SFA
and BPC.
		 — Send cadre of Training Brigade through the
Defense Institute of Security Assistance
Management (DISAM) to perform that
mission.111
		 — Fully man interagency positions at Training
Brigade. DoS consider conducting all R&S
training with Training Brigade.
		 — TMAAGs will train to GCCs number one
priority country in both language and
cultural skills.
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— Each BdAATT will get a focus area for
language and cultural studies IAW GCC
priorities.
		 — TTs will train to ARFORGEN like model and
conduct JRT rotation prior to deployment.
Additionally, support CTCs when applicable.
• Leadership:
		 — TTs conduct approximately 1 year of training
prior to becoming operational.
		 — TTs conduct AOR familiarization with the
GCCs priority countries.
		 — SAAC develops knowledge, skill, and ability
profile of leader skills in order to select the
best candidates.
		 — Provide 1 year internships with interagency
before or after assignment in SAAC prior to
returning to GPF.
		 — Allow Officers and NCOs to stay in this area
without promotion discrimination.
• Material:
		 — Equip SAAC with GPF equipment plus
TMAAG specific items required for advisor
duties.
		 — SAAC develops new equipment and
technologies to make this mission more
effective.
		 — Secure funding through Title 10, Title 22, or
1206.
• Personnel:
		 — SAAC would not be a branch but would
recruit advisors from the GPF.
		 — Voluntarily assess candidates into program.
Assign at last resort.
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— Candidates would conduct an assessment
for entrance into program. Operational
psychologists would have to be part of
assessment team.
		 — Optimal assignment length is 4 years. First
year is training with 3 years of execution.
Officer tours would occur after company
command prior to CGSC. NCOs after branch
qualifying jobs as a staff sergeant.
		 — Consider cohort concept for TMAAG teams.
		 — Provide ASI and pro-pay to advisors.
		 — Track unique capabilities in Army for future
operations in TMAAGs.
		 — Refine board guidance for promotion and
command opportunities as well as first
sergeant and command sergeants major
positions.
		 — Develop unique advisor patch and tab for
wear after specific criteria have been met
(i.e., five advisor tours in country, etc).
		 — BdAATTs and BAATTs may contain a
mixture of combat arms officers (i.e., not
pure fleet infantry if armor officers or NCOs
are available).
• Facilities:
		 — Basing options for the relative HQs are based
on the preponderance of current capabilities
around the country.
		 — SAAC and MAAC could be stationed at Fort
Leavenworth, based on JCISFA and current
commanders at that location.
		 — The Training Brigade should continue to
go to Fort Polk as currently planned. This
would optimize CTC rotation integration
and training area availability.
		 — The TMAAGs and RMTs should co-locate
57

		

		

with the ASCC (either forward or at home
station). Another option is to pair them with
SF groups to develop common training
synergies, develop AORs, and share TTPs.
— The IFGC could be stationed at Carlisle
Barracks, PA. They would integrate PKSOI
into their force structure and would be close to
Washington, DC, to facilitate coordination.
— The JNMT would be co-located with JFCOM
at Norfolk, VA.

CONCLUSION
The United States is faced with expanding Islamic
extremism, changing European and Sino-American
relations, economic and financial globalization,
population growth, and environmental and energy
imperatives, while simultaneously conducting a war
in two countries. We live in an era of persistent conflict
where state, nonstate, and individual actors will use
terrorism and violence to threaten our safety and
freedoms. “Operations in the future will be executed
in complex environments and will range from peace
engagement to counterinsurgency to major combat
operations. This era of persistent conflict will result in
high demand for Army forces and capabilities.”112
To gain access, acquire influence, and build
partner capacity on a global scale, we must relook
our engagement strategy and the tools we have to
apply to that strategy. Our history, our policy, our
doctrine, and our current requirements for Security
Force Assistance and Building Partner Capacity clearly
highlight our capability and capacity gaps. Our Army
must institutionalize military, police and governance
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operations and provide a new structural paradigm for
the manner in which we interact with the world.
The requirement to streamline processes from
Shaping to Stability Operations is in our vital national
interest. The Army does possess sufficient force
structure to fill a portion of our current capability and
capacity gaps. However, the Army is committed to
employing “full-spectrum” BCTs to meet every mission
requirement. This paper suggests that we only build
five more BCTs rather than six. The recommended
Security Assistance and Advisory Command would
contain 4,717 personnel to meet the demands of our new
operational environment. With this construct, we could
meet our global engagement missions, which have
been deferred worldwide, while continuing to fight in
Iraq and Afghanistan. GCCs and Ambassadors would
have regionally trained experts to employ, shape, and
develop ungoverned areas and reduce global risk. A
permanent military, police, and governance capability
would complement the work of MILGRPs, SF ODA
FID missions, as well as regionally aligned BCTs.
Together these organizations could be task
organized to provide optimal Army capability to meet
our National Security Strategy. It is time to take the
initiative and create new structures that provide a more
effective Joint, interagency and multinational team.
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GLOSSARY
ADCON
Advisory Control
AFRICOM U.S. Africa Command
AOR		
Area of Responsibility
ARC		
Active Response Corps
ARFORGEN Army Force Generation
ASCC		Theater Army/Army Service
Component Command
BAATT
BCT		
BdAATT

Battalion Advise/Assist Training Team
Bridge Combat Team
Brigade Advisory/Assist Training Team

CA			
Civil Affairs
CBO		
Congressional Budget Office
CENTCOM U.S. Central Command
CIA		
Central Intelligence Agency
CIDG		
Civilian Irregular Defense Group
COCOM
combatant command
COE		
Center of Excellence
COIN		
Counterinsurgency
CONUS
Continental United States
CORDS	Civil Operations and Revolutionary
Development Support
CORDSG	Civil Operations, Reconstruction, and
Development Support Group
CRC		Civil Response Corps/Civilian Reserve
Corps
CRSG		Country Reconstruction and
Stabilization Group
DISAM	Defense Institute of Security Assistance
Management
DLIFLC 	Defense Language Institute Foreign
Language Center
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DoD		
DoS		
DOTLMPF
		
		
EA			
EUCOM
FID		
FLAG		
FM		
FMS		
FSF		
FSO		

Department of Defense
Department of State
Doctrine, Organizations, Training,
Leader Development, Materiel,
Personnel, and Facilities
Executive Agent
U.S. European Command
Foreign Internal Defense
Forward Liaison and Assistance Group
Field Manual
Foreign Military Sales
Foreign Security Forces
Foreign Service Officer

GCC		
GPF		
GWOT

Geographic Combatant Commander
General Purpose Forces
Global War on Terror

HASC		
HN		
HQDA
HTT		

House Armed Services Committee
Host Nation
Headquarters Department of the Army
Human Terrain Team

IDAD		
Internal Defense and Development
IFGC		Interagency Foreign Governance Center
of Excellence
IPC		
Integration Planning Cell
ITB		
Individual Training Battalion
IW 		
Irregular Warfare
IWJOC 	Irregular Warfare Joint Operating
Concept
JCISFA 	Joint Center for International Security
Force Assistance
JNMT		
Joint National Ministry Team
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JOC		
JSCP		

Joint Operating Concept
Joint Strategic Capacilities Plan

KMAG

Korean Military Advisory Group

MAAG
MACV
			
MAG		
MARSOC

Military Assistance Advisory Group
Military Assistance Command—		
Vietnam
Military Advisory Group
U
 .S. Marine Corps, Special Operations
Command
MCO		
Major Combat Operations
MCTAG	Marine Corps Training and Advisory
Group
MEB		
Maneuver Enhancement Brigade
MI			
Military Intelligence
MILGROUP/
MILGRP
U.S. Military Group
MNSTC-I	Multi-National Security Transition
Command-Iraq
MP		
Military Police
MT		
Ministry Team
NCO		
Noncommissioned Officer
NETC		
Naval Expeditionary Combat Command
NMT/RMT National/Regional Ministry Team
NORTHCOM U.S. Northern Command
NRT-TRT	National and Theater Reconstruction
Team
NSPD		
National Security Presidential Directive
OCONUS
outside continental United States
ODA		Special Forces Operational Detachment
Alpha team
ODC
Office of Defense Cooperation

73

ODL
OEF		
OG		
OGA		
OIF		
OMC

Office of Defense Liaison
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM
Operations Group
Other Government Agency
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
Office of Military Cooperation

PAATT
Police Advise and Assist Training Team
PCB		
Partner Capacity Building
PKSOI		Peacekeeping and Stability Operations
Institute
PME
Professional Military Education
PRT
Provincial Reconstruction Team
PT			
Police Trainer
PSYOPS
Psychological Operations
R&S 		Reconstruction and Stabilization
RFO		
Regional Affairs Officer
RMT		
Regional Ministry Team
S/CRS	State Coordinator for Reconstruction
and Stabilization
SA			
Security Assistance
SAAC		Security Advisory and Assistance
Command
SAO
Security Assistance Office
SATD
Security Assistance Training Directorate
SATFA
Security Assistance Training Field
Activity
SATMO
S
 ecurity Assistance Training
Management Organization
SATP
Security Assistance Training Programs
SC-MAGTF 	Security-Cooperation Marine Air
Ground Task Force
SFA		
Security Force Assistance
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SOF		
Special Operations Forces
SOUTHCOM U.S. Southern Command
SRC		
Standby Response Corps
SSTR		Stability, Security, Transition, and
Reconstruction
SSTRO	Stability, Security, Transition, and
Reconstruction Operations
STEG		
Security Training and Equipping Group
TACON/	tactical control/
OPCON
operational control
TCC		
TRADOC Cultural Center
TDA		
Table of Distribution and Allowances
TMAAG	Theater Military Advisory and
Assistance Group
TMAAG-F	Theater Military Advisory Assistance
Group-Forward
TOE		
Table of Organization and Equipment
TRADOC	U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command
TSB		Training Support Battalion/Training
Support Brigade
TSC		
Theater Security Cooperation
TT			
Transition Team/Training Team
UFMCS	University of Foreign Military and
Cultural Studies
USAIA
U.S. Army Intelligence Agency
USAID	U.S. Agency for International
Development
USAISC	U.S. Army Intelligence School and
			
Center
USAR		
U.S. Army Reserve
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USASAC
USIA		
UW		

U
 .S. Army Security Assistance
Command
U.S. Information Agency
unconventional warfare
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